Part II. Japanese Advance on Nanjing and Nationalist Government Response

1. Japanese Westward Advance after Occupying Shanghai

After the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in July 1937, the Battle of Shanghai began on August 13. The Japanese government issued a statement on August 15: “We were forced to take drastic measures earlier, to punish the Chinese army for its violence and to wake up the Nanjing government.” On August 17, Japan's cabinet also decided that, “We abandon the previous non-expansion policy, and are planning various measures required under the wartime situation.”(1) On August 16, Japan organized the Shanghai Expeditionary Army, composed mainly of the 3rd and 11th Divisions. Matsui Iwane was appointed commander and was dispatched to Shanghai to commence operations.

On the morning of August 23, the Japanese 3rd and 11th Divisions made forced landings at Wusong and Chuansha, which intensified the battle in Wusong. China's 15th Army Group, commanded by Chen Cheng, was sent to defend the south bank of the Yangtze River. The Chinese and Japanese armies clashed repeatedly and fought hard battles along a line from Baoshan to Yuepu, Luodian, and Liuhe. Japanese army reinforcements and heavy artillery ultimately pushed the Chinese forces back in mid-September to defend Beizhan, Jiangwan, Yangjiazhai, and Luodian along a southwest line to Shixianggong Temple.

Beginning in mid-September 1937, Japan's 9th and 101st Divisions arrived on the Shanghai battlefield, along with the Shigefuji Detachment. The Chinese army suffered major losses and was forced onto the defensive. As the defending army bitterly fought the Japanese along Suzhou Creek, the 6th and 18th Divisions of the Japanese Tenth Army, along with the Kunisaki Detachment, made landings at Quangong Pavilion, Jinshanwei, and Caojing on Hangzhou Bay at dawn on November 5, with the assistance of massive artillery fire. They branched off to head directly toward the Songjiang area, so that the defending Chinese forces were attacked from all sides. Subsequently, the Japanese 114th Division landed to the west of Jinshanwei on November 10 and headed toward Jiaxing. On the Chinese side, the Third Military Region issued a transfer order on November 8, and the Nationalist Central Army began to move toward Qingpu and Baihegang. The right and left flanks moved toward the Wujiang-Fushan front, and the combat troops on the left covered the retreat of the right flank. The defending troops serving as cover in the Nanshi and Pudong areas finally withdrew on the evening of November 11. Shanghai then fell on November 12.

The fall of Shanghai marked the end of the Battle of Shanghai, but also signaled the beginning of Japan's massive westward advance on the capital of Nanjing. Southern Jiangsu Province bore the brunt of the Japanese advance toward the capital. Every county in the Songhu area, which at that time was under the jurisdiction of Jiangsu Province, fell in succession around the time of the fall of Shanghai.

The Japanese 11th Division occupied Taicang on November 14. The 9th Division took Kunshan on the 15th and, beginning on the 17th, broke through all major positions between Kunshan and Suzhou. On November 19, Xue Qiu, commander of the left flank forces of China's Third Military Region, issued an order to retreat from the Wujiang-Fushan line, and Suzhou and Changshu subsequently fell on the same day.

The Wujiang-Fushan line was broken, and the Japanese 9th, 11th, and 16th Divisions advanced to attack the Wuxi-Jiangyin line. As Chinese troops retreated to defend that line, they engaged in heavy fighting with the attacking Japanese on numerous occasions. On November 26, after the Chinese forces made their final defense at the Wuxi-Jiangyin line, they decided to abandon that line while steadfastly defending their position at Jiangyin. Part of that force headed toward Changzhou, while the other portion retreated to south Anhui Province. The city of Wuxi fell on November 27.

The Japanese divisions that had captured Wuxi moved in pursuit of the Chinese army along the Nanjing-Shanghai Railway, the Grand Canal south of the Yangtze, Lake Tai, and the highway on the north shore of Lake Tai, capturing Changzhou on November 29. Meanwhile, the 114th Division of the Japanese Tenth Army, concentrated around Changxing and Huzhou, occupied Yixing on November 28.

To capture the fortifications at Jiangyin, at the northernmost end of the Wuxi-Jiangyin line, one battalion from the Japanese 13th Division moved along the Wuxi-Jiangyin highway, while two infantry regiments advanced down the Changshu-Jiangyin highway. Fierce battles took place between the Japanese and the Chinese troops defending Jiangyin, with heavy casualties on both sides. On December 2, 1937, Jiangyin was occupied by the Japanese. At the same time, the Japanese 9th Division occupied Jintan, the 16th Division took Danyang, and the 114th Division occupied Liyang. On December 4, the Japanese 114th Division took Lishui; on December 5, the 16th Division occupied Jurong; and on December 8, Zhenjiang fell to the 13th Division and the Amaya Detachment of the 11th Division.

Chinese troops resisted the Japanese throughout south Jiangsu Province. Although this effort delayed the speed of the Japanese invasion, the fall of cities and towns throughout the area removed the last barriers protecting the capital of Nanjing, which came under a massive, direct attack.

As the Japanese Tenth Army landed at Hangzhou Bay in early November, the Japanese authorities issued Imperial General Headquarters (IGH) Army Order No. 138 on November 7 to organize the Central China Area Army, with General Matsui Iwane as commander and Major General Tsukada Osamu as chief of staff. The Shanghai Expeditionary Army and the Tenth Army were under its command. The order stipulated that, “The Central China Area Army's mission is to collaborate with the Navy to thwart the enemy's will to fight, and annihilate the enemy in the vicinity of Shanghai in order to seek an opportunity to end the war.”(2)

As Chinese troops retreated step by step from the eastern battlefields and the Japanese army rapidly pursued them westward, the original order from the General Staff Headquarters in Tokyo to create a line from Suzhou to Jiaxing was actually no longer effective. On November 28, the Japanese General Staff issued a new order via telegram, “Advance to attack Nanjing.” In his Battle Journal entry that day, Matsui Iwane wrote, “The Vice Chief sent a telegram to convey the decision of the General Staff Headquarters to attack Nanjing. I am delighted in feeling that, these days, my strong suggestions of encouragement have finally had an effect.”(3)

By means of IGH Army Order No. 7 on December 1, 1937, the Japanese authorities issued the order of battle for the Central China Area Army. Its structure and primary commanders remained the same as before. On December 2, Tokyo removed Matsui Iwane from his concurrent post as commander of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army, and replaced him with Lieutenant General Prince Asaka Yasuhiko. With the exception of the 101st Division, which was ordered stationed in Shanghai, all other divisions and detachments of the Central China Area Army were to varying degrees part of the military operations to advance upon Nanjing. Some of those units were involved in fighting on the periphery of Nanjing to clear the road ahead and surround the city. Those directly involved in attacking the city of Nanjing included the 9th, 16th, 6th, and 114th Divisions, the Kunisaki Detachment, the advance detachment of the 3rd Division, and the Yamada Detachment of 13th Division. The total force was about 100,000 soldiers.

On December 1, 1937, the Central China Area Army received IGH Army Order No. 8: “The Central China Area Army Commander is to coordinate with the navy to capture the enemy capital of Nanjing.” The two forces under the Central China Area Army were ordered to deploy on the same day as follows:

1. The Central China Area Army will plan and coordinate with the China Area Fleet to capture Nanjing.
2. The main force of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army will begin to move around December 5. It will remain in Danyang and Jurong to destroy the enemy there, and enter the western area of Mopan Mountain. Another unit will attack the enemy's rear from the left bank of the Yangtze River, while cutting off the Tianjin-Pukou Railway and the Grand Canal north of the Yangtze River.
3. The main force of the Tenth Army will begin to move around December 3. One unit will enter behind Nanjing from Wuhu; the main force will destroy the enemy at hand and enter the vicinity of Lishui. Vigilance shall be strengthened particularly in the Hangzhou area.(4)

After receiving the order, all forces of the Central China Area Army advanced rapidly to attack Nanjing. They started out from Shanghai and Lake Tai to the east and headed toward Nanjing along both sides of the lake. The Japanese army intended to advance on Nanjing by encircling it, occupy the Chinese capital, and surround and annihilate the Chinese army outside the city.

2. Japanese Air Strikes on Nanjing and Chinese Anti-Aircraft Operations

Once the Battle of Shanghai began, as China's capital, Nanjing became an important target of Japanese air raids. On August 15, 1937, 20 Japanese Navy Air Service attack aircraft bombed Nanjing for the first time. They bombed Dajiaochang Airport and the Ming Palace Airport, and they strafed the densely populated areas of Bafutang, Daxinggong, and Zhongshan East Road. There were dozens of civilian and military casualties. As reported by the Shanghai newspaper Shun Pao, “The wounded were taken to hospitals for treatment. Nine were counted at Central Hospital, three at Xiaguan Infectious Diseases Hospital, including a seriously injured person, two at the Fengfu Road Health Clinic, and ten at the Houcheng Bridge Clinic.”(5) During the air strikes, Chinese fighters were launched for combat and deployed a fierce counterattack amid the heavy fire in the vicinity of the airports. They shot down four Japanese aircraft and hit a number of others. According to detailed combat report records from the Japanese navy's First Combined Air Group, the 20 aircraft were from the Kisarazu Air Group, and were led by Lieutenant Commander Hayashida. They were ordered to depart from the Omura Air Base to bomb Nanjing's Dajiaochang and Ming Palace Airports. As a result, “due to fire from enemy fighters and ground artillery, four aircraft crashed in flames,” and “six aircraft are in need of repair.”(6)

On August 16, the Japanese dispatched about 70 aircraft to conduct five air raids on Nanjing. The Chinese air force also scrambled all of its fighters, which shot down a total of eight Japanese aircraft that day.

Afterward, Japanese aircraft continually engaged in bombing raids on Nanjing and its surrounding areas. From midnight on August 26 through the early morning hours of August 27, a total of 14 Japanese aircraft conducted two night raids on the city of Nanjing. Japanese aircraft randomly dropped bombs and firebombs from high altitudes onto densely populated areas. A neighborhood in the southern part of the city, the School for Bereaved Families in the eastern outskirts, and the Third Provincial Hospital in the city center were all hit.

In a telegram order on September 14, Vice Admiral Hasegawa Kiyoshi, about to become commander in chief of the Japanese navy's Third Fleet, created the Nanjing Attack Squadron, composed of the 2nd, 4th, and 5th Attack Squadrons. Beginning on September 16, they were to make “repeated attacks on Nanjing” and “attack enemy air forces, military facilities, and major government agencies in the Nanjing area.”(7) The commander was concurrently commander of the 2nd Combined Air Group, in charge of 72 combat aircraft of various types. On August 17, Mitsunami Teizō, commander of the Japanese 2nd Combined Air Group, “Instruct[ed] commanders at all levels to courageously implement air strikes on Nanjing,” declaring their order to “concentrate elite troops from each force to create the Nanjing Attack Squadron and resolutely implement the feat of an unprecedented decisive air battle in the skies over the enemy capital of Nanjing.”(8) Based on this plan, Japanese aircraft bombed Nanjing 11 times between September 19 and 25.

On September 19, a total of 77 Japanese aircraft conducted two air raids over Nanjing, bombing the Central Broadcasting Station, the Capital Security Command, and residential areas. Downriver, houses were destroyed in Kaopeng, Baijiufang, and Pingshi Street. The Central University campus and dormitories were hit by eight 550-pound bombs. On September 20, 57 Japanese aircraft made two air attacks on Nanjing's Nationalist Government buildings, radio station, Dajiaochang Airport, and artillery emplacements along the Yangtze River. The Chinese air force deployed 11 fighters to dauntlessly engage and fire on the Japanese aircraft, shooting down two planes at once in the skies over Purple Mountain; the other Japanese aircraft fled the scene. On September 22, 61 Japanese aircraft were deployed in three sorties to indiscriminately bomb more than 30 locations in Nanjing, including the densely populated Chengnan Avenue, the new residential area in which foreign embassies were located, and the refugee camp in Xiaguan. As reported by Shun Pao, “When the Xiaguan refugee camp was bombed, flesh and blood flew in four directions; it was an extremely tragic scene. The bombs burned down the crude shacks of thousands of refugees and thick smoke billowed into the sky, seemingly visible hundreds of miles away.”(9)

Japanese aircraft conducted the largest bombing raid yet on Nanjing on September 25, 1937. Between 9:30 a.m. and 4:30 p.m., four air strikes were made, involving 94 aircraft sorties, which dropped more than 200 bombs and strafed the areas with machine guns. When the Japanese aircraft approached Nanjing, the Chinese air force immediately dispatched fighters to engage with them, and deployed heavy anti-aircraft fire from the outskirts of the city. The fighting was fierce. Shun Pao reported, “According to the Air Force Command, a total of four enemy aircraft were shot down today; two fell in Xiaguan and one in Nancheng (South City), and one was said to fall outside of Nanmen (South Gate). There were witnesses to three of the downed aircraft.”(10)

By early December 1937, Chinese and Japanese forces were battling fiercely around Nanjing's ancient city wall. When they were not providing air support to their infantry positions, Japanese aircraft conducted raids inside the city from time to time. Le Yiqin, deputy commander of the 4th Air Group, 2nd Squadron of China's Air Force, gave his young life during the final air battle on December 3, on the eve of the fall of Nanjing. He was one of the “Four Great Protectors” of the Chinese air force and known as the “steel shield over southern China.” At noon on December 5, a squadron of Japanese aircraft attacked the right-hand side of the Yangtze River bank east of the Yixian Bridge, dropping more than 20 bombs, killing 14, injuring more than 20, and burning more than 50 houses to the ground. A Shun Pao correspondent reported, “The sound of explosions and falling walls rang together, like ear-splitting thunder, while flames and columns of smoke rose into the sky. Seemingly one or two minutes later, the sounds of women and children crying and screaming burst out.”(11)

The Japanese navy stated that, “Our navy's air force has carried out repeated air strikes on the capital of Nanjing, the hub of the anti-Japanese war, making over 50 raids using a total of more than 900 aircraft sorties, and dropping more than 160 tons of bombs.”(12) The Chinese air force and Nanjing air defense forces engaged with the invading Japanese aircraft despite the great disparity in strength. The valiant Nanjing air battle dealt a heavy blow to the Japanese forces and greatly encouraged the fighting spirit of both soldiers and civilians in China. The Nanjing air battle lasted nearly four months, and was both a prelude to and an important component of the Battle of Nanjing.

3. Nationalist Government Measures to Defend Nanjing

As Shanghai fell, and it became increasingly clear that the Japanese objective would be to attack and capture China's capital of Nanjing, the Chinese government began to consider relocating its capital in order to prolong the War of Resistance. On October 29, 1937, Chiang Kai-shek made a report to the National Defense Council, “The Relocation of the Nationalist Government Capital to Chongqing and the Future of the War.” This was the first official presentation on the question of moving the capital. On November 12, in consultation with Nationalist Government Chairman Lin Sen, Chiang Kai-shek made the major decision to relocate the capital to Chongqing. Chiang wrote in his diary on November 13, “The last areas and main front for resisting the dwarves(13) are at the Guangdong-Hankou Railroad and the Beiping-Hankou Railroad to the west…. Determined to move the capital to Chongqing.”(14)

The Nationalist Government agencies in Nanjing began a mass relocation on November 16, 1937. Chairman Lin Sen boarded the ship Yongsui in Nanjing and departed for Sichuan on that day. Among the government agencies relocating inland, the Executive Yuan, Legislative Yuan, Control Yuan, and Examination Yuan moved directly to Chongqing. The Ministries of Finance and Foreign Affairs, and the Department of Health, relocated temporarily to Hankou. The Ministry of Communications moved temporarily to Changsha, while a portion of the military authorities remained in Nanjing for the time being. Subsequently, the embassies of the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union, and other countries moved to Hankou, the location of the Chinese Foreign Ministry's offices. On November 20, the Nationalist Government formally issued a statement about its move to Chongqing. The statement confirmed the military successes and fighting spirit of the past three months and declared the objective of moving the Nationalist Government to Chongqing and the commitment to persist in the War of Resistance.

In the face of the westward-advancing Japanese, the Chinese military authorities simultaneously managed the retreat of the Shanghai defense forces and prepared to move the capital. They also put the question of defending Nanjing on the agenda for discussion. To determine a defensive strategy for the city, Chiang Kai-shek held a senior staff meeting and separately sought the advice of certain senior generals. Those participating in the discussions included Minister of War He Yingqin, Military Affairs Commission Standing Committee Member Bai Chongxi, Military Affairs Commission Office Director Xu Yongchang, Military Affairs Commission Executive Department Director Tang Shengzhi, Headquarters Operations Director Liu Fei, and Capital Security Division Commander Gu Zhenglun. Liu Fei proposed that, “Nanjing is the capital of our nation; of course we cannot give it up without any resistance. But we should not lose too many troops fighting for one city or area at a time. We can use only a symbolic defense and take the initiative to retreat after an appropriate level of resistance. As for the use of our forces, we can use twelve regiments; eighteen regiments at most is enough. Too many troops will not be easy to maneuver.” He Yingqin and Xu Yongchang both expressed support for Liu Fei's view.(15) Bai Chongxi stated that the forces on the eastern battlefields were decimated and exhausted and that it was not possible in the short term to organize a large-scale campaign to defend the city; Nanjing should therefore be declared an undefended city. Tang Shengzhi eloquently stated that, “Nanjing is our nation's capital, which is a focal point of international attention, and is also the site of President Sun Yat-sen's mausoleum. If we abandon Nanjing, how can we account for ourselves before the soul of the President in Heaven?”(16)

Chiang Kai-shek and Tang Shengzhi had similar views. Of course, Chiang was also forced to consider additional factors. The Nine Power Treaty Conference was being held in Brussels, Belgium, during that time. Chiang hoped that the United Kingdom, the United States, and other Western countries at the conference would impose sanctions on Japan. The German ambassador to China, Oskar P. Trautmann, also secretly conveyed to China during that time the Japanese conditions for armistice. Chiang hoped that the war would end at the city of Nanjing. He therefore advocated for a short-term defense of Nanjing. He wrote in his diary, “We cannot defend Nanjing, and yet cannot afford not to defend it. We would not have an explanation for anyone from top to bottom, the nation or the people.”(17) He expressed his principles for defending Nanjing in this way: “It is not a question of defending or not defending the city of Nanjing, but a matter of how long to defend it. The enemy has superior firepower and can freely navigate the Yangtze River. We wish to hold it, but it is quite difficult to do; we can therefore only hope to defend it for a relatively short time.” Chiang also said, “Since we hope to engage in a shorter defense of the city, we do not have to use all of our backbone forces and sacrifice them all. We must plan to cover their withdrawal.... When we are forced to abandon Nanjing, and each defending force retreats, they must have cover.”(18)

Once the short-term defense policy for Nanjing was established, Chiang Kai-shek then made Tang Shengzhi commander of the Nanjing Garrison on November 19, 1937. Tang took office the next day and reorganized his own Military Affairs Commission Executive Department into the Garrison Command Department. On November 24, the Nationalist Government announced Tang's appointment as commander of the Nanjing Garrison. The next day, Chiang personally drafted the preliminary order of battle for the Nanjing Garrison Command:“ (1) Tang Shengzhi is in command. (2) Sun Yuanliang is in command of the 72nd Corps. (3) Song Xilian is in command of the 78th Corps. (4) Capital Security Division—Gu Zhenglun, (A) Gui's [Yongqing—Ed.] brigade, (B) Military Police force. (5) Other special forces.”(19)

As they retreated westward from the Shanghai battlefield, a succession of Chinese detachments arrived in the outskirts of Nanjing, along with forces deployed from areas further east to defend Nanjing. The troop arrangement of the Nanjing Garrison Command continually expanded. In addition to units specializing in transport, artillery, air defense, armor, communications, and intelligence, the main forces included the 2nd Army, commanded by Xu Yuanquan, the 66th Corps (Ye Zhao), the 71st Corps (Wang Jingjiu), the 72nd Corps (Sun Yuanliang), the 74th Corps (Yu Jishi), the 78th Corps (Song Xilian), the 83rd Corps (Deng Longguang), the Training Brigade (Gui Yongqing), the 103rd Division (He Zhizhong), the 112th Division (Huo Shouyi), and the Military Police forces (Xiao Shanling). There were 13 division formations and 15 regiment formations (11 Training Brigade regiments and four Military Police regiments), totaling about 150,000 men. On December 6, the Nationalist Government appointed Luo Zhuoying and Liu Xing as deputy commanders in chief of the Nanjing Garrison.

During the first part of December 1937, the Nanjing Garrison forces were constantly adjusted and augmented, and forces were allocated at two levels on the periphery of the city: the main positions and the alternate positions. The “Detailed Battle Report of the Nanjing Garrison Forces” reads:

1. The main positions along the line from Banqiao to Chunhua Town were held by two divisions of 74A. The line from Mengtang to Longtan was held by 83A divisions (later replaced by 10A).
2. The alternate positions between Shizi (Lion) Hill and the area north of the city were held by 36D; those from Andemen to Yuhuatai were held by 88D, and from Heding Bridge to the army engineering school by 87D. The Training Brigade held those from the front edge of Purple Mountain north to Jiangwang Temple.(20)

Such a troop configuration indicated that the Nanjing Garrison forces would fight to defend their territory and resist the enemy with determination. Restricted by a shortage of troops, however, the defensive front for each unit was too broad, and they could not link up with each other. The situation also exposed the weakness of the commanders' passive defense strategy, which foreshadowed the loss of the defensive battle.

 

---

(1) Military History Department, National Institute for Defense Studies, Japanese Defense Agency, Shina jiken rikugun sakusen [The China Incident: History of army operations], Vol. I, Part 2, translated into Chinese by Qi Fulin as, Zhongguo Shibian lujun zuozhan shi (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Co., 1981), 5.

(2) “Lincanming di 138 hao” (Zhaohe 12 nian 11 yue 7 ri) [IGH Army order no. 138 (November 7, 1937)], in Zhang, Wang, and Lei, Historical Collection, Vol. 11, 4.

(3) Matsui Iwane, “Songjing Shigen zhenzhong rizhi” [Battle journal of Matsui Iwane], in Zhang and Wang, Historical Collection, Vol. 8, 140.

(4) “Huazhong Fangmian Jun mingling (1937 nian 12 yue 1 ri)” [Central China Area Army order (December 1, 1937)], in Zhang, Wang, and Lei, Historical Collection, Vol. 11, 22.

(5) “Ri ji zuo jinxi shoudu” [Japanese aircraft attacked capital yesterday], Shun Pao [Shanghai news], August 16, 1937, 2.

(6) “Di-yi Lianhe Hangkong Dui zhandou xiangbao” [Detailed battle report of the First Combined Air Group], in Nanjing Da Tusha shiliaoji, di 57 ce: Rijun wenxian (xia) [Nanjing Massacre historical collection, Vol. 57 (2): Japanese military documents], ed. Zhang Xianwen and Wang Weixing, trans. Liu Jun and Luo Wenwen (Nanjing: Jiangsu People's Publishing, Ltd., 2010), 783—785.

(7) “Di-san Hangdui jimi di 347 hao dian” [Third Fleet secret telegram no. 347 (September 14, 1937)], in Nanjing Da Tusha shiliaoji, di 32 ce: Riben junfang wenjian yu guanbing riji [Nanjing Massacre historical collection, Vol. 32: Japanese military documents and officer diaries], ed. Zhang Xianwen and Wang Weixing, trans. Ye Lin, et al. (Nanjing: Jiangsu People's Publishing, Ltd., 2007), 295.

(8) “Erliankong xunshi di wu hao (1937 nian 9 yue 17 ri)” [Second Combined Air Group instruction no. 5 (September 17, 1937)], in Zhang, Wang, and Ye, Historical Collection, Vol. 32, 297—298.

(9) “Shoudu tiankong dazhan wo kongjun die zou qi gong” [Major air battle over capital, repeated feats by Chinese air force], Shun Pao [Shanghai news], September 23, 1937, 1.

(10) “Diji zuo wu ci xi Jing” [Five air attacks on capital by enemy yesterday], Shun Pao [Shanghai news], September 26, 1937, 2.

(11) “Riji dadui xi Jing Zhongshanmen wai zhi Xihuamen Dajie pinmin quyu bei zha canburendu” [Japanese aircraft squadron hits Nanjing, bombs create scene of devastation from outside Zhongshan Gate to Xihuamen Avenue impoverished area], Shun Pao [Shanghai news], December 6, 1937, 2.

(12) “Wanquan zhangwo zhengge Zhina de zhikongquan kongxi Nanjing wushi yu ci (‘Dongjing riri xinwen’ 1937 nian 12 yue 18 ri),” [Over fifty air raids on Nanjing, complete control of Shina air power (Tokyo Daily News, December 18, 1937)], in Nanjing Da Tusha shiliaoji, di 58 ce: “Dongjing Riri Xinwen” yu “Daban Meiri Xinwen” [Nanjing Massacre historical collection, Vol. 58: Reports in the Tokyo Daily News and Osaka Daily News], ed. Zhang Xianwen and Wang Weixing, trans. He Ciyi and Li Bin (Nanjing: Jiangsu People's Publishing, Ltd., 2010), 244.

(13) The Chinese word used here, wō, was a derogatory term for the Japanese.—Trans.

(14) Jiang Jieshi riji [Chiang Kai-shek diaries], photocopies, Stanford University Hoover Archives.

(15) Liu Fei, “Kangzhan chuqi de Nanjing Baoweizhan” [Battle of Nanjing during the early War of Resistance], in Nanjing Baoweizhan [Battle of Nanjing], compiled by the Battle of Nanjing Editorial Group, CPPCC National Committee Cultural and Historical Data Research Committee (Beijing: Chinese Literature and History Press, 1987), 8—9.

(16) Ibid., 9.

(17) Chiang Kai-shek Diaries (November 26, 1937), Stanford University Hoover Archives.

(18) Third Military Region Command Department, Kangzhan jishi [Documentary records of the War of Resistance], RG 787, File No. 3944, Second Historical Archives of China.

(19) “Jiang Jieshi zhi Tang Shengzhi dian (1937 nian 11 yue 25 ri)” [Chiang Kai-shek telegram to Tang Shengzhi (November 25, 1937)], in Kangri Zhanzheng zhengmian zhanchang (shang ce) [Frontline battlefields in the War of Resistance against Japan, Vol. I], compiled by the Second Historical Archives of China (Nanjing: Jiangsu Ancient Books Publishing House, 1987), 400.

(20) “Di-san Zhanqu Nanjing Huizhan jingguo gaiyao” [Outline of the Third Military Region during the Battle of Nanjing], in Second Historical Archives, Frontline Battlefields in the War of Resistance, Vol. I, 415. “A” stands for Army [also commonly translated as “Corps,” as done here to reduce confusion—Trans.] and “D” for Division. 10A actually refers here to the 2nd Army.